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Abstract—Mobile Ad Hoc networks (MANETs) are 
susceptible to having their effective operation compromised by 
a variety of security attacks.  For example, misbehaving nodes 
can cause general network disruption by not forwarding 
packets on behalf of other nodes in the network. Nodes may 
misbehave either because they are malicious and deliberately 
wish to disrupt the network, or because they are selfish and 
wish to conserve their own limited resources such as power, or 
for other reasons.  In this paper, we present a mechanism 
capable of detecting and accusing nodes that exhibit packet 
forwarding misbehavior. Our evaluation results demonstrate 
that our algorithm effectively detects and accuses nodes that 
drop a significant fraction of packets. 
Keywords - mobile ad hoc network, misbehavior detection, 
node accusation, packet forwarding. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) consists of a group 
of devices (or nodes) that rely solely on the wireless 
communication medium and themselves for data 
transmission. Nodes cooperate by forwarding packets on 
behalf of each other when destinations are out of their direct 
wireless transmission range. A centralized administration 
and/or a pre-deployed network infrastructure are not 
necessary for a MANET to be set up, thus making its 
deployment quick and inexpensive. In addition, nodes’ 
ability to move freely ensures a flexible and versatile 
dynamic network topology which can be desirable in many 
situations. Mobile ad hoc networks are ideal in 
environments where installing an infrastructure is not 
appropriate for reasons such as cost, quality, or 
vulnerability, or where the network is too transient, or the 
infrastructure has been destroyed. Examples of MANET 
applications are: emergency disaster relief (destroyed 
infrastructure), military operations over a battlefield 
(vulnerable infrastructure), and wilderness expeditions 
(transient networks), and community networking and 
interaction between students during a lecture. 
The wireless nature and inherent features of mobile ad 
hoc networks make them vulnerable to a wide variety of 
attacks by misbehaving nodes. Such attacks range from 
passive eavesdropping, where a node tries to obtain 
unauthorized access to data destined for another node, to 
active interference where malicious nodes hinder network 
performance by not obeying globally acceptable rules. For 
instance, a node can behave maliciously by not forwarding 
packets on behalf of other peer nodes. However, when a 
node exhibits malicious behavior it is not always because it 
intends to do so. A node may also misbehave because it is 
overloaded, broken, compromised or congested in addition 
to intentionally being selfish or malicious [3,11]. An 
overloaded node lacks the CPU cycles to attend its local 
and/or network tasks, which leads it to drop packets owing 
to its inability to process them. A broken node has a 
software or hardware fault that prevents it from performing 
its network duties properly. A compromised node may be 
victim of an attack that degrades its data forwarding 
capabilities. A congested node receives more packets than 
the bandwidth available to it allows it to send, its buffer fills 
and eventually it has to drop incoming packets.  A selfish 
node is unwilling to use its resources such as battery life, 
bandwidth or processing power to forward packets on behalf 
of other nodes. A malicious node drops packets or generates 
additional packets solely to disrupt the network performance 
and prevent other nodes from accessing any network 
services (a denial of service attack). Both selfish and 
malicious nodes expect, however, other nodes to forward 
packets on their behalf in spite of their own misbehavior. 
Misbehavior can be divided into two categories [3]: 
routing misbehavior (failure to behave in accordance with a 
routing protocol) and packet forwarding misbehavior 
(failure to correctly forward data packets in accordance with 
a data transfer protocol). In this paper we focus on the latter. 
Our approach consists of an algorithm that performs two 
tasks: a) enables packet forwarding misbehavior detection 
through the principle of conservation of flow [25], and b) 
enables the accusation of nodes that are consistently 
detected exhibiting packet forwarding misbehavior. A node 
that is accused of misbehavior is denied access to the 
network by its peers, which ignore any of its transmission 
attempts. Thus, misbehaving nodes are isolated from the rest 
of the network. Our scheme is not tightly coupled to any 
specific routing protocol and, therefore, it can operate 
regardless of the routing strategy adopted. Our criterion for 
judging a detection on a node is the estimated percentage of 
packets dropped, which is compared against a pre-
established misbehavior threshold. Any node dropping 
packets in excess of this threshold is deemed a misbehaving 
node while those below the threshold are considered to be 
correctly behaving. 
Our scheme detects and accuses misbehaving nodes 
(whether selfish, malicious or otherwise) capable of 
launching two known attacks: the simplest of them is the 
black hole attack. In this attack a misbehaving node drops 
all the packets that it receives instead of normally 
forwarding them. A variation on this is a gray hole attack, in 
which nodes either drop packets selectively (e.g. dropping 
all UDP packets while forwarding TCP packets) or drop 
packets in a statistical manner (e.g. dropping 50% of the 
packets or dropping them with a probabilistic distribution). 
Both types of gray hole attacks seek to disrupt the network 
without being detected by the security measures in place.  
In this paper we first present a framework and a relevant 
algorithm and protocol that deal with these attacks. We then 
demonstrate through simulations that an appropriate 
selection of the misbehavior threshold allows for a good 
discrimination between misbehaved and well-behaved 
nodes, as well as providing robustness against different 
degrees of node mobility in a network that is affected by 
black hole and/or gray hole attacks.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes related work in the area of MANET security. 
Section III specifies our assumptions on the network and 
security models and clarifies the terminology adopted. 
Section IV describes our algorithm for packet forwarding 
misbehavior detection and accusation, and Section V 
presents a performance evaluation. Finally, the paper is 
concluded in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Work has been conducted by other authors both on 
securing the route discovery part of routing protocols, and 
on packet forwarding. In this Section we initially look at 
ways of protecting the network against misbehaving nodes 
and data forwarding anomalies. We then review work that 
attempts to detect and penalize misbehavior in data packet 
forwarding. 
A. Routing and Packet Forwarding Protection. 
Secure routing protocols have been proposed based on 
existing ad hoc routing protocols. These eliminate some of 
the optimizations introduced in the original routing 
protocols because they can be exploited to launch different 
types of attacks. Examples of such protocols are the secure 
efficient distance vector (SEAD) routing [6] which is based 
on the destination sequenced distance vector (DSDV) [12], 
the secure ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (SAODV) 
routing protocol [9, 10] based on AODV [13, 14], and the 
secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks 
(Ariadne) [2] based on the dynamic source routing (DSR) 
protocol [15] and the timed efficient stream loss-tolerant 
authentication (TESLA) protocol proposed in [17]. Also 
extending DSR to provide it with security mechanisms is 
CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic 
Ad-hoc NeTworks) [18]. These approaches only secure the 
path discovery and establishment functionality of routing 
protocols, thus our approach complements them by securing 
the data forwarding functionality. 
  Some research effort has also been focused on the 
development of new routing protocols whose objective is to 
protect the network from security threats that were not 
addressed by work preceding them. The Secure Routing 
Protocol (SRP) [7] and Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc 
Networks (ARAN) [8] achieve routing protection assuming 
and making use of the existence of a priori relationships in a 
network. However, a priori relationships in MANETs may 
not exist. As with SEAD, SAODV, Ariadne and 
CONFIDANT these protocols can be coupled with our 
approach, which is not routing protocol dependent, to offer 
an improved security solution. 
The routing protocol proposed in [16] offers resilience to 
Byzantine behavior (any action that results in the disruption 
or degradation of the data forwarding service) by an 
algorithm that allows the detection of an anomalous link 
after log n faults have occurred on a path, where n is the hop 
length of the path. In [19] when a node has broken the 
security mechanisms of a network is regarded as an intruder. 
Each node is able to detect signs of intrusion locally and 
neighboring nodes collaborate to further investigate 
malicious behavior. In both these approaches a node uses its 
own data to identify another node as an intruder. In contrast, 
in our approach a node detects anomalies in packet 
forwarding based on data acquired by other nodes in the 
network as well as on its own data.  
The Secure Message Transmission (SMT) and Secure 
Single Path (SSP) protocols are both introduced in [20]. In 
SMT a message that is to be sent towards a destination is 
first divided in N parts and then sent by N independent 
paths. Each part carries a limited amount of redundancy in 
such a way that only M parts, where M<N, are needed at the 
destination to recover the whole message. SSP is a specific 
case of SMT where only one path is used at a time and the 
source tries a different path each time an acknowledgment is 
not received. However, SMT is very bandwidth-intensive, 
and these protocols do not attempt to find the source of the 
packet loss. Our protocol, on the contrary, identifies any 
source(s) that appear to be causing packet losses, allowing 
for their isolation at a later stage through the accusation 
phase. 
Attack patterns have been the object of research in order 
to identify known attacks through abnormal packets. In [4] 
and [5] the authors propose a framework for misuse 
detection which divides the nodes in a network into two 
categories: insiders and outsiders. Insiders are always well-
behaved nodes that belong to trusted users and run an 
intrusion detection system (IDS) module to detect attacks 
launched by outsiders through packets with abnormal 
contents. Unfortunately, this framework fails to make use of 
well-behaved outsiders that could contribute to relevant 
tasks and rewards misbehaving outsiders by allowing them 
to use the network. In this regard, our protocol punishes 
misbehaving nodes by denying them access to the network 
and its services.  
B. Misbehavior Detection 
There has been some work that aims to protect data 
packet forwarding against malicious attacks in order to 
provide reliable network connectivity. The final part of this 
section describes some approaches that detect malicious 
behavior in the data forwarding phase. WATCHERS 
(Watching for Anomalies in Transit Conservation: a 
Heuristic for Ensuring Router Security) [25] is a protocol 
designed to detect disruptive routers in fixed networks 
through analysis of the number of packets entering and 
exiting a router. In this approach each router executes the 
WATCHERS protocol at regular intervals in order to 
identify neighboring routers that misroute traffic and avoid 
them. WATCHERS requires the existence of at least one 
path not affected by disruptive routers between any two well 
behaved routers in the network. Although WATCHERS is 
based on the principle of conservation of flow in a network 
in the same way as our proposed algorithm, its design 
focuses only on fixed networks and is not applicable to 
mobile ad hoc networks. Additionally, in our approach the 
broadcasting nature of the wireless medium allows for 
multiple possible paths between any two well behaved 
nodes.  
In [24] the authors look at traffic transmission patterns 
between any two communicating nodes in order to facilitate 
verification by a receiver. Such traffic patterns can be 
analyzed if they are used in concert with suboptimal 
techniques at the medium access control (MAC) layer that 
preserve the statistical regularity from hop to hop. In this 
scheme a node can distinguish between a misbehaving node 
and a congested node, knowing the traffic transmission rates 
from other nodes to the target node. This work, however, 
has a very narrow scope of application due to its MAC layer 
assumptions to preserve statistical regularity, and thus it is 
very unlikely for it to be useful in scenarios other than 
military applications. 
SCAN (self-organized network layer security in mobile 
ad hoc networks) [3] focuses on securing packet delivery. It 
uses AODV [13, 14], but argues that the same ideas are 
applicable to other routing protocols. SCAN assumes a 
network with sufficient node density that nodes can 
overhear packets being received by a neighbor, in addition 
to packets being sent by the neighbor.  SCAN nodes monitor 
their neighbors by listening to packets that are forwarded to 
them.  The SCAN node maintains a copy of the neighbor’s 
routing table and determines the next-hop node to which the 
neighbor should forward the packet; if the packet is not 
overheard as being forwarded, it is considered to have been 
dropped.  In contrast, in our algorithm nodes do not need to 
overhear transmissions to and from any neighbor in order to 
detect misbehavior. In SCAN each node must possess a 
valid token to be able to interact with the network and 
though nodes monitor their neighbors independently, all 
nodes in a local neighborhood collaborate with each other to 
eventually convict a suspicious node by revoking its token. 
The tokens’ lifetime is determined by a credit strategy that 
helps reducing the total network overhead. Token renewal 
and revocation is done through threshold secret sharing and 
secret share updates. SCAN develops these ideas from [21] 
where they are used to give a valid key to a new node 
entering the network and from then onwards to renew its 
key periodically. Similar techniques have also been studied 
in various papers such as [22], where they are used to 
achieve distribution of trust throughout a network.  SCAN is 
similar to our approach in the sense that it does not only 
detect the source of misbehavior, but it also punishes any 
misbehaving nodes. However, SCAN makes use of 
cryptographic techniques that may prove too resource 
demanding for devices with limited capabilities. 
Finally, in [23] a system that can mitigate the effects of 
packet dropping is proposed. This is composed of two 
mechanisms that are kept in all network nodes: a watchdog 
and a pathrater. The watchdog mechanism identifies any 
misbehaving nodes by promiscuously listening to the next 
node in the packet’s path. If such a node drops more than a 
predefined threshold of packets the source of the 
communication is notified. The pathrater mechanism keeps 
a rate for every other node in the network it knows about. A 
node’s rate is decreased each time a notification of its 
misbehavior is received. Then, nodes’ rates are used to 
determine the most reliable path towards a destination, thus 
reducing the chance of finding a misbehaving node along 
the selected path. This work as described uses DSR but it is 
claimed it can easily be adapted to other source routing 
protocols. However, its applicability has not yet been 
addressed for distance-vector based routing protocols. 
Moreover, the watchdog might not detect a misbehaving 
node in the presence of ambiguous collisions, receiver 
collisions or nodes capable of controlling their transmission 
power (described in section IV.A). Such weaknesses are the 
result of using promiscuous listening to determine whether a 
node has forwarded a packet or not. Our approach does not 
have these same weaknesses since it is based on metrics 
obtained from nodes that are actually sending and receiving 
packets to and from the node whose behavior is under 
evaluation, as explained in section IV.A. Also, using 
pathrater can be considered a reward for selfish nodes since 
the flow is diverted towards other nodes in the network 
while selfish nodes preserve their resources. In contrast, our 
approach denies access to the network to any node that has 
been accused of misbehavior, thus discouraging them from 
dropping packets. 
III. ASSUMPTIONS AND TERMINOLOGY  
A. Model Assumptions 
The physical layer of a wireless network is often 
vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks such as 
frequency jamming. Spread spectrum and frequency 
hopping are examples of techniques that have been studied 
as means of preventing this type of attacks. The link layer is 
also subject to attacks where nodes gain unfair access to the 
medium or where they disrupt communications, for example 
by dropping packets related to typical handshake processes. 
We disregard attacks aimed at the physical and link layers. 
We assume bidirectional communication symmetry in 
every direct link between a pair of nodes. This means that if 
a node v2 receives a packet from node v1, v1 can also receive 
a packet from v2. This is a sensible assumption since our 
approach needs MAC protocols with collision avoidance 
mechanisms to work properly, such as the extensively 
deployed IEEE 802.11, MACA (Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance) [11] and MACAW (MACA for 
Wireless LANs) [1], which require bidirectional 
communication for reliable transmission. 
We assume the MAC layer protocol to be reliable (e.g. 
IEEE 802.11).  This is required to provide confidence that a 
data packet has been successfully transmitted to the next-
hop node, and enables us to apply the principle of flow 
conservation (see Section IV.A). 
We also assume that all nodes in the network are adapted 
with wireless interfaces that support promiscuous mode 
operation. This operational mode allows a node to process 
all transmissions from nodes within hearing range. This is 
required in order to determine active nodes in a node’s 
neighborhood and schedule events to check their behavior at 
a later stage. 
At the network layer we assume that nodes misbehave 
by dropping packets despite having agreed to forward them 
during route discovery. Other types of misbehavior are not 
taken into account including any type of attack by two or 
more colluding nodes. 
This paper does not address security measures for our 
misbehavior detection and accusation approach since it 
focuses on the basic proposal of misbehavior and detection 
mechanisms. However, cryptographic techniques such as 
threshold secret sharing and secret share updates used in 
SCAN [3] could be used as viable ways of protecting the 
detection and accusation packets (Section IV.C) of our 
approach. 
B. Terminology 
We use the term neighbor to refer to a node that is 
within the direct wireless transmission range of another 
node. From this, it follows that both nodes are able to 
establish a reliable bidirectional communication. Likewise, 
the term neighborhood refers to all nodes that are neighbors 
of a particular node. A node is not a neighbor of itself and, 
therefore, a node does not belong to its own neighborhood. 
We use the term detection to mean that our algorithm 
has identified that a node appears to be misbehaving. A 
detection is based on a single check of the node’s behavior. 
An accusation, on the other hand, occurs when a node 
reports another node as misbehaving. It is our view that an 
accusation should be based on more than a single positive 
detection to increase confidence in the assessment, as we 
discuss in Section IV.C below. Additionally, in Section V it 
is shown how the number of detections needed to raise an 
accusation affects the percentage of nodes correctly accused 
of misbehavior. 
A misbehaving node is represented by a given drop 
characteristic, e.g. dropping packets with 30% probability. 
In our simulations, a uniform distribution is used.  We use 
the parameter d to indicate the fraction of packets dropped. 
IV. DETECTING AND ACCUSING MISBEHAVING 
NODES  
Our work provides a novel methodology to secure the 
data forwarding functionality in mobile ad hoc networks. 
We propose an approach that takes advantage of the 
principle of flow conservation in a network. This states that 
all bytes/packets sent to a node, and not destined for that 
node, are expected to exit the node. In this Section we first 
present, from a theoretical point of view, how this principle 
works assuming it is implemented in an ideal network, and 
then we demonstrate that by making some reasonable 
assumptions and adaptations, our algorithm can cope with 
the practical problems that are encountered in real 
MANETs.  
A. The Principle of Flow Conservation 
We now formally introduce the principle of flow 
conservation over an ideal static network model: 
• Let vj be a node such that vj ∈ V, where V = {v1, v2, v3 … 
vN} is the set of all nodes in the network, N is the total 
number of nodes in the network, and j= 1, 2, 3 … N. 
• Let Uj be the subset of nodes in the network which are 
neighbors of vj, i.e. Uj is the neighborhood of vj. It 
follows that vj ∉ Uj and also Uj ⊂ V. 
• Let Δt be the period of time elapsed between two points 
in time t0 and t1 such that Δt = t1 – t0. 
• Let Tij be the number of packets that node vi has 
successfully sent to node vj for vj to forward to a further 
node; vi ∈ Uj, vj ∈ Ui, i ≠ j and Tij(t0) = 0. 
• Let Rij be the number of packets that node vi has 
successfully received from node vj that did not originate 
at vj; vi ∈ Uj, vj ∈ Ui, i ≠ j and Rij(t0) = 0. 
If all nodes vj ∈ V remain static for a period of time Δt 
during which no collisions occur in any of the transmissions 
over an ideal (noiseless) wireless channel, then for a node vj: 
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Equation (1) gives the fundamental premise of the flow 
conservation principle in an ideal static network applied to 
packets rather than raw bytes. It states that if all neighbors 
of a node vj are queried for i) the amount of packets sent to 
vj to forward and ii) the amount of packets forwarded by vj 
to them, the total amount of packets sent to and received 
from vj must be equal. 
In practice networks exhibit conditions that are far from 
ideal. First of all, the wireless channel is error prone and 
packets get lost while in transit. Secondly, collisions happen 
when the network uses protocols where nodes have to 
compete for the medium, such as when the link layer 
protocol is based on the distributed coordination function 
(contention period) of the IEEE 802.11 a/b standard. In 
order to allow equation (1) to hold we propose to use a 
reliable MAC protocol such as IEEE 802.11, MACA or 
MACAW.  
A reliable MAC protocol at the link layer acknowledges 
each successfully transmitted packet and thus transmitter 
and receiver can maintain synchronized values of their 
metrics Tij and Rij. For instance, when node v1 needs to 
transmit a packet to v2, v1 sends an RTS frame and v2 replies 
with a CTS frame. Following the reception of the CTS, v1 
sends the data which may collide at the receiver with the 
transmission of some other node v3 that heard neither the 
RTS nor the CTS frame for example because v3 has just 
moved into range. In this case v2 does not increase its R21 
metric because it did not receive the data, and v1 does not 
increase its T12 because the packet was never acknowledged. 
Even in the eventuality that an ACK frame gets lost the 
nodes would realize the error when v1 retransmits the data. 
In this case, v2 increases its R21 metric the first time it 
receives the data packet and sends back the respective ACK 
frame. Node v1 does not increase its T12 metric since it does 
not receive the ACK frame and instead it retransmits the 
packet, sending an RTS frame and waiting for a CTS frame. 
The second time that v2 receives the packet it will notice that 
the packet has been already received by checking the 
sequence control field in the MAC header, so it does not 
increase its R21 metric and it acknowledges again the packet 
as stipulated in the 802.11 standard. When v1 receives the 
ACK it will increase its T12 metric and equation (1) holds 
again. 
The use of a reliable MAC protocol in conjunction with 
the conservation of flow principle means that we are not 
susceptible to problems that arise when overhearing other 
nodes’ transmissions. Thus, problems such as ambiguous 
collisions, receiver collisions, and the ability of a node to 
control its transmission power do not exist in our approach. 
Ambiguous collisions occur when a node v1 is trying to 
determine if another node v2 is properly forwarding a 
packet. It may happen that node v2 forwards the packet to a 
further node v3, which is out of the transmission range of v1, 
while a second transmission prevents v1 from overhearing 
the forwarded packet, thus v1 will not know if the packet 
was forwarded. On the other hand, in the receiver collision 
problem v2 forwards the packet to v3 at which point a 
collision occurs. Node v1 is unaware of such a collision and 
assumes that the packet was forwarded even if v2 does not 
attempt a retransmission. Another common problem is 
caused by nodes capable of controlling their transmission 
power. Thus, v2 can transmit with enough power for v1 to 
overhear but not enough power for v3 to receive it, leaving 
v1 unaware of the situation. All these weaknesses, which can 
be used by malicious nodes to disrupt the network, are due 
to the fact that overhearing is used by nodes to check for 
misbehavior in other nodes, as in [3, 23]. In our algorithm 
the nodes that maintain statistics that are used to determine 
whether the forwarding was properly made are the nodes 
actively involved in the transmission process, i.e. the 
transmitter and the receiver of each transmission. 
However, a node may exhibit malicious behavior even if 
it is not purposefully doing so. For example, an overloaded 
node may temporarily lack the CPU cycles, buffer space or 
bandwidth to forward packets. In addition, some reactive 
routing protocols, e.g. AODV, cause buffered packets to be 
dropped if they go through a path that is even temporarily 
unavailable. For these reasons equation (1) cannot be 
applied in a rigorous manner and a threshold needs to be 
established to account for packets dropped by a node 
through no fault of its own. Equation (2), which holds for 
well behaved nodes, reflects this change: 
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The αthreshold factor can take values between 0 and 1 and 
as we shall see plays an important role in the detection 
power of our proposed algorithm, i.e. the capability of the 
algorithm to detect misbehaving nodes. The lower αthreshold is 
the more likely it is that our algorithm detects any malicious 
behavior. However, it also means that the probability of a 
false detection increases, as it can be inferred from our 
simulations (Section V). A false detection occurs when the 
result of a single evaluation of a node mistakenly determines 
that the node appears to be misbehaving. Therefore, fine 
tuning is required to reach a fair point in this tradeoff and 
reduce the probability of an incorrect accusation. 
B. Adapting Conservation of Flow to Mobile Networks 
In MANETs the neighborhood Uj of a node vj changes 
dynamically over time, making it difficult to determine 
those nodes that have transmitted or received packets to or 
from a node vj. Our scheme overcomes this problem by 
means of a limited broadcast that tracks down nodes that 
have been in contact with node vj as explained later in 
Section IV.C. 
Every node in the network is required to keep three 
tables: an overhead nodes table, a detection table and an 
accusation table. The overheard nodes table contains the IDs 
of those nodes that have been overheard recently through 
promiscuous listening. Entries in this table are removed 
once they go stale (e.g. if a node in the table has not been 
overheard in the last t seconds). This process helps a node vj 
to keep track of nodes that have become part of its 
neighborhood Uj while they were actively intervening in the 
network. The detection table contains the IDs of those nodes 
that have been detected as misbehaving and the number of 
times their misbehavior has been reported. Finally, the 
accusation table keeps the IDs of those nodes that have been 
accused of misbehavior. Nodes are typically accused of 
misbehavior because they have reached within a predefined 
period of time the number of misbehavior detections 
required to be accused. 
C. Algorithm 
The core parts of our algorithm are detailed in the 
pseudocode shown in figure 1.  A node vi maintains a table 
with two metrics Tij and Rij (Fig. 1.a), which contains an 
entry for each node vj to which vi has respectively 
transmitted packets to or received packets from. Node vi 
increments Tij on successful transmission of a packet to vj 
for vj to forward to another node, and increments Rij on 
successful receipt of a packet forwarded by vj that did not 
originate at vj. 
All nodes in the network continuously monitor their 
neighbors and update the list of those they have heard 
recently (Fig. 1.b). If the ID of an overheard node is not 
included in the table of overheard nodes a new entry is 
created. Otherwise, the existing entry is updated with a 
timestamp corresponding to the time the node was last 
overheard. Upon the creation of a new entry, a node 
schedules a task/event to check the behavior of the node 
whose ID has been saved in the new entry. Nodes randomly 
select a period of time between Tmin and Tmax to schedule the 
behavior checking task. This random selection seeks to 
reduce the possibility of two or more nodes starting a 
behavior check on the same node at the same time, wasting 
network bandwidth, battery energy and other network 
resources. 
When a scheduled task is triggered in node vi to check 
vj’s behavior (Fig. 1.c), node vi broadcasts a metrics request 
packet (MREQ) with TTL = 1 in the IP header. An MREQ 
includes the ID of the node emitting the request (SRC_ID), 
the ID of the node whose behavior is to be checked 
(CHK_ID), an MREQ_ID and a timestamp indicating the 
time at which the task was triggered. The MREQ_ID is used 
in the same way as in some routing protocols which base 
their route discovery phase on broadcasting. If a node sees 
an MREQ that has the same MREQ_ID and SRC_ID of a 
packet seen before, the MREQ is dropped. This technique 
prevents flooding packets from traversing a zone of the 
network more than once. The timestamp, on the other hand, 
is used to resolve conflicts when two nodes start a behavior 
check on the same node at almost the same time. In such 
cases, nodes can see which of the packets corresponds to the 
earlier triggered task and disregard the other. Nevertheless, 
two or more unsynchronized nodes performing a behavior 
check on the same node will generate different timestamps. 
In this case nodes receiving the MREQ packets will select 
the packet with the earliest timestamp and will reply 
accordingly. Thus our approach does not require accurate 
synchronization of the nodes’ clocks. Finally, after the 
MREQ packet is broadcast, a task is scheduled to be 
triggered a period of time Tmax (maximum elapsed period of 
time without checking an active node’s behavior) later.  This 
means it is highly unlikely that the same node will originate 
two successive checks of another node, and gives other 
nodes a chance to perform the behavior check. 
The handling of requests (Fig. 1.d) illustrates the heart of 
our limited broadcast algorithm. When a node receives an 
MREQ it first checks if the CHK_ID is in its table of 
overheard nodes; if it is not the node ignores the MREQ and 
discards the check. However, if the CHK_ID appears in its 
table then it rebroadcasts the MREQ with TTL = 1 in the IP 
header. Setting the TTL to one allows our algorithm to 
control how far the broadcast of the MREQ is to go, instead 
of leaving this task to the IP protocol. Thus, every MREQ 
travels only one hop at a time, and is then analyzed and 
rebroadcast if the protocol so determines. By following this 
algorithm, our protocol is capable of tracking down nodes 
that have been in contact with the checked node, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. We assume transmissions can be 
overheard by vertically, horizontally and diagonally 
adjacent nodes. In the Figure, node v7 is first in position a 
where it can be overheard by nodes v1, v2, v3, v6, v8, v11, v12 
and v13. Each of these nodes makes an entry in their table of 
overheard nodes when v7 first transmits and each of them 
schedules a task to check its behavior. At some point in 
time, v7 decides to move following the path depicted in 
Figure 2 coming in contact with nodes v14, v17, v18, v19, v20, 
v23, v24 and v25. It finally stops in position b. In the Figure 
the scheduled behavior check initiation task (Fig. 1.c) in v8 
is the first to be triggered and the limited broadcast 
commences. All nodes that have overheard node v7 re-
broadcast the MREQ, whereas nodes such as v4, v9 and v15 
also receive the MREQ but ignore it because they have not 
overheard node v7. 
 
a. MONITORING 
if node vi successfully sends a packet to node vj 
.   increase Tij 
endif 
if node vi receives a packet successfully forwarded by node vj 
.   increase Rij 
endif 
 
b. BEHAVIOR CHECK SCHEDULING 
if node vi overhears a node vj ∈  Uk 
.   if node vj is not in vi’s table of overheard nodes 
.   .   add node vj to vi’s table of overheard nodes 
.   .   schedule an event to check vj’s behavior 
.   else 
.   .   update last time node vj was heard 
.   endif 
endif 
 
c. INITIATE BEHAVIOR CHECK 
if in node vi an event to check node vj’s behavior is triggered 
.   send a metrics request packet (MREQ) with node vj’s ID 
.   schedule another event to check vj’s behavior again at t+Tmax 
endif 
 
 
d. REQUEST HANDLING 
if node vi receives a metrics request for node vj 
.   if node vi has node vj in its table of overheard nodes 
.   .   rebroadcast metrics request packet (MREQ) 
.   .   reschedule any event to check vj’s behavior 
.   .   if node vi has metrics for node vj 
.   .   .   send a metrics reply (MREP) back to the requesting node 
.   .   endif 
.   else 
.   .   ignore request 
.   endif 
endif 
 
e. REPLY HANDLING 
if a request was sent out 
.   while there are more replies to be received for node vj 
.   .   receive reply 
.   .   acknowledge reply reception (send MACK) 
.   .   add received metrics to totals 
.   endwhile 
. 
.   if  ∑∑
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≤−
jiji Uvi
ij
Uvi
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||
)1( α  
.   .   node vj is misbehaving (detection) 
.   .   send a detection alert packet (DAP) with node vj’s ID 
.   else 
.   .   node vj is not misbehaving (non-detection) 
.   endif 
endif 
 
f. DETECTION ALERT HANDLING 
if node vi receives a detection alert for node vj 
.   if node vi has node vj in its table of overheard nodes 
.   .   rebroadcast detection alert packet (DAP) 
.   .   if max_num_of_detections for node vj has been reached 
.   .   .   broadcast na accusation packet (AP) with node vj’s ID 
.   .   endif 
.   else 
.   .   ignore detection alert 
.   endif 
endif 
 
g. ACCUSATION HANDLING 
if node vi receives an accusation packet for node vj 
.   if node vi has node vj in its accusation table 
.   .   ignore accusation packet 
.   else 
.   .   add node vj to vi’s accusation table 
.   .   rebroadcast accusation packet (AP) 
.   endif 
endif 
 
h. PUNISHING ACCUSED NODES 
if node vi receives a packet from node vj 
.   if node vj is in node vi’s accusation table 
.   .   ignore packet 
.   else 
.   .   handle and process the packet 
.   endif 
endif 
Figure 1.  Our algorithm pseudocode. 
It may also happen that node v7 stops transmitting and 
receiving packets before it moves to a different network 
area. Then, after moving, v7 may become active again 
forming a new neighborhood. In this case the old and new 
neighborhoods are not connected by nodes that have 
overheard v7 and, therefore, a limited broadcast triggered in 
one neighborhood will not reach the other. In spite of this, 
our algorithm still works properly because two independent 
behavior checks will be performed on v7: one at its old 
neighborhood and another at its new neighborhood. The 
outcome of each of these behavior checks depends on the 
behavior exhibited by v7 at each neighborhood. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Example of limited broadcast to track down nodes that 
have  overheard node v7. 
Once a node has decided whether to continue or not 
broadcasting a MREQ, it reschedules any pending task to 
check the behavior of the checked node specified in the 
CHK_ID field of the MREQ. The new behavior checking 
task is scheduled in the same way as when a new entry is 
made in the table of overheard nodes, i.e. a period of time is 
randomly selected between Tmin and Tmax. In this way if the 
random selection is uniformly distributed the average 
frequency with which an active node’s behavior is checked 
is: 
)(
2
2/)(
1_
maxminmaxmin TTTT
freqavg +=+=
  (3) 
The last task a node performs when it receives a MREQ 
is to check if it has any metrics (Rij or Tij) relating to the 
node being checked. If any of the metrics has a value other 
than zero the node returns a metrics reply packet (MREP) 
(Fig. 1.d) containing the metrics, but if the value of both 
metrics is zero then the node does not send back any 
response. In our scheme a metrics reply packet is returned to 
the node that originated the MREQ following the reverse of 
the MREQ’s path. This requires nodes to set a backward 
pointer when they receive an MREQ. This approach avoids 
the high overhead produced by reactive routing protocols 
when they perform route discovery for many MREP 
packets. 
Reply handling is executed in the node that initiated the 
MREQ. This node, v8 in Fig. 2, waits for a period of time in 
order to give all nodes with metrics about the checked node 
the opportunity of replying. When the time expires, the node 
checks the behavior of the analyzed node by verifying that 
equation (2) holds (Fig. 1.e). If it does not, this is considered 
a detection and a detection alert packet (DAP) containing 
the detected node ID is broadcast with TTL = 1 in its IP 
header. Detection alert packets are broadcast in the same 
way as MREQs, i.e. they follow our limited broadcast 
algorithm (Fig. 1.f). 
Due to the nature of our algorithm nodes are not 
perfectly synchronized with each other. A MREQ will reach 
close nodes faster than nodes placed a few hops away. The 
last nodes to receive the MREQ have enough time to send or 
receive some extra packets to and from the analyzed node, 
thus unbalancing the values of the Tij and Rij metrics. This 
discrepancy, in which some packets may have been sent to 
the node being analyzed but not yet forwarded by it, is 
accommodated by αthreshold. 
A problem that has been detected in our simulations has 
its roots in the dynamic nature of MANETs. Nodes 
receiving a MREQ with non-zero metrics for the checked 
node send back their reply. However, such replies 
sometimes get lost due to collisions, noise in the wireless 
channel or link/path breakages due to the mobility of the 
nodes. If the value of the metrics contained in the lost reply 
is small compared to the total obtained after adding up the 
replies that do not get lost, αthreshold can accommodate them 
and equation (2) holds. Unfortunately, this is not always the 
case and some of those replies that get lost contain key 
information for the calculations and the checked node is 
then falsely detected as misbehaving. This is one of the 
reasons why an accusation should not be made based on a 
single detection. Using a single detection to accuse a node is 
not sufficient since such an approach may lead to false 
accusations against correctly behaving nodes. Our scheme in 
which multiple detections by different nodes are necessary 
to accuse a node is fairer to well-behaved nodes, while 
keeping a high probability of correctly accusing 
misbehaving nodes. Additionally, to circumvent the lost 
replies problem we propose an optional module to our 
algorithm. A node receiving an MREP as it is forwarded 
towards its destination (i.e. the node performing the 
behavior checking task) will also send a metrics 
acknowledgement packet (MACK). Thus, nodes 
sending/forwarding an MREP wait for an MACK from the 
next hop in the route. If the confirmation does not arrive 
then they retransmit the MREP. The process is repeated up 
to MAXRetx retransmission retries before giving up. The 
results obtained in our simulations have demonstrated that 
this technique can significantly improve the results in 
MANETs with a high degree of mobility. Simulations have 
also shown that the most significant improvement can be 
seen when comparing the results for MAXRetx=0 (without 
retransmitting any reply) and MAXRetx=1. Subsequent 
increases to MAXRetx improve the results further but not 
significantly. 
The handling of detection alerts (Fig 1.f) is also 
determined by our limited broadcast algorithm. This means 
that the information to accuse a node of misbehavior is 
collected locally rather than globally. When a node receives 
a detection alert packet (DAP) it first checks if the reported 
node ID contained in the received packet is present in its 
table of overheard nodes; if it is not the node stops 
broadcasting the DAP. However, if the ID appears in its 
table then it rebroadcasts the DAP with TTL = 1 in the IP 
header. Thus, nodes can control how far the DAP broadcast 
is to go in the same way they do with a MREQ. For 
instance, assuming that v8 in Fig. 2 detects that v7 is 
misbehaving, the DAP follows the same path as that 
depicted in the Fig. 2 for a MREQ packet. Although this 
approach prevents nodes from generating excessive network 
overhead, it may also permit malicious nodes constantly 
changing their geographical position in a clever manner 
(without going back to previously visited areas) to avoid 
being accused. After a node has decided whether continue 
broadcasting a DAP or not, it checks if an entry for the 
reported node ID has been already created in its detections 
table. If it has not a new entry is created with its field 
number of detections equal to one. If the entry is already 
present its number of detections is increased and then 
compared against a detections threshold. When the number 
of detections reaches the detections threshold in less than a 
predefined period of time Tthreshold there is enough evidence 
to accuse the reported node of misbehavior. Therefore, an 
accusation packet (AP) is broadcast in a network wide 
fashion so that access is denied to the reported node all over 
the network. 
Nodes that receive an accusation packet (Fig. 1.g) 
examine their accusation tables to see whether the reported 
node has been accused previously. When an AP with a 
newly accused node is received a new entry is created in the 
accusation table and the broadcast of the AP continues. 
Otherwise, the packet is ignored and dropped to prevent 
unnecessary network traffic. Finally, all nodes in the 
MANET are responsible to ensure that packets coming from 
an accused node (a node present in their accusation table) 
are immediately dropped (Fig. 1.h). This approach denies 
misbehaving nodes any chance to have their packets 
transmitted in the network as well as to participate in route 
discovery, thus preventing them from causing further 
disruption in the communication process. 
V. EVALUATION 
We perform our simulations using the GloMoSim 
simulation package. The results presented for each value are 
the average of 10 simulation runs. Tests with a larger 
number of simulations (e.g. 20) give results that vary 
typically no more than 1% from those presented here. 
Unless explicitly stated otherwise our simulation 
parameters, which correspond to typical values used by 
other authors, take the following values: i) nodes move 
according to the random waypoint mobility model with a 
speed randomly chosen with uniform distribution between 
0ms-1 and 10ms-1, this yields a mean node speed of 5ms-1 
and a speed standard deviation of 2.89ms-1,  ii) the pause 
time takes a value that is exponentially distributed with 
mean 30 seconds, iii) the wireless transmission range of 
every node is 100 meters, iv) the link capacity is 2 Mbps, v) 
the MAC layer protocol is the IEEE 802.11 DCF, vi) the 
underlying routing protocol is AODV, and vii) the total 
simulation time for each scenario is 1800 seconds. Our 
results are presented in two parts: part A focuses on the 
detection power of our algorithm, i.e. how well our 
algorithm can distinguish between well behaved and 
misbehaving nodes, and part B focuses on the capability of 
our algorithm to accuse misbehaving nodes and improve the 
average network throughput while maintaining an 
acceptable network overhead. 
A. Detecting Misbehaving Nodes 
An important parameter to evaluate the effectiveness of 
an approach that detects and accuses misbehaving nodes is 
its detection power. In this section we present results that 
demonstrate that our approach has a high probability of 
detecting truly misbehaving nodes while maintaining a low 
probability of performing false detections, i.e. wrongly 
detecting a well behaved node as a misbehaving one. For 
this set of results the network was set-up with 40% of its 
total nodes misbehaving by not forwarding all packets. 
Nodes check the behavior of active nodes within a period 
chosen uniformly between 40 and 60 seconds, and keep any 
overheard node in their tables for 120 seconds after the last 
time they are heard. On average an active node is checked 
approximately 36 times in each 1800 second simulation. 
The principal metric in our tests is the percentage of 
detections and it is assessed in terms of misbehavior 
threshold and node speed. 
We initially consider our misbehavior detection 
algorithm in terms of the misbehavior threshold, which is 
the parameter αthreshold in equation (2), i.e. the maximum 
percentage of packets that a node is allowed to drop without 
being detected as a misbehaving node. In order to see the 
effect of the misbehavior threshold on nodes, simulations 
were carried out with networks containing 20 and 60 nodes, 
and areas of 40 000m2 (200m*200m) and 120 000m2 
(346.41m*346.41m) respectively. These values ensure that 
node density is preserved between both scenarios. We varied 
both the packet drop probability of misbehaving nodes and 
the misbehavior threshold between 0% and 100%. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Increasing Misbehavior Threshold, α threshold
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f D
et
ec
tio
ns
80% Misbehavior Drop (d = 0.8)
50% Misbehavior Drop (d = 0.5)
20% Misbehavior Drop (d = 0.2)
10% Misbehavior Drop (d = 0.1)
Non Misbehaving Nodes (d = 0)
 
Figure 3.  Percentage of positive detections as a function of the 
increasing misbehavior threshold (20 node network). 
Figures 3 and 4 show the percentage of positive 
detections as a function of misbehavior threshold for nodes 
exhibiting different probabilities of misbehavior for 
networks with 20 and 60 nodes respectively. It can be 
inferred from both graphs that the criterion to select an 
adequate misbehavior threshold depends on the level of trust 
required in the network as well as on network characteristics 
such as network size and node density. The lower the 
threshold is the more packets nodes need to forward to be 
considered well-behaved. However, since characteristics 
inherent to MANETs such as mobility and the noisy 
wireless medium can cause some packets to be lost 
(including packets of our own protocol), it also means that 
an increasing number of correctly behaving nodes can be 
falsely detected as misbehaving ones. 
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Figure 4.  Percentage of positive detections as a function of the 
increasing misbehavior threshold (60 node network). 
A similar problem occurs with misbehaving nodes that 
drop a small percentage of packages, e.g. less than 10% of 
packets. The graphs show how the less misbehavior a node 
exhibits the more its curve resembles that of a well behaved 
node, making distinguishing between them a complex task. 
Finally, it can also be seen from Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 that 
selecting a misbehavior threshold equal to a node’s 
misbehaving probability prevents our approach from 
identifying misbehaving nodes with certainty, i.e. the 
probability of detection is approximately 50%. These 
occurrences are all contained in the zone between 40% and 
60% probability of detection in the figures. 
Selecting an acceptable or tolerable level of misbehavior 
x in a network is a policy decision. This policy then allows a 
value of αthreshold to be set depending on the desired detection 
probability. For example, for a detection probability of 
>90% our results suggest that αthreshold should then be set at 
approximately x-0.1 for the 20 node network and x-0.15 for 
the 60 node network. 
Our second set of results assesses the performance of our 
misbehavior detection algorithm in terms of the degree of 
mobility of the nodes in the network. This time the 
misbehaving nodes drop packets with a 50% probability 
while the misbehavior threshold is kept at 40%. The mean 
node speed varies between 0ms-1 (a static network) and 
20ms-1 while the speed standard deviation for all 
measurements is 0.58ms-1. Whereas Fig. 5 is plotted for 
misbehaving and well-behaved nodes in a 20 node network, 
Fig. 6 is plotted for misbehaving and well-behaved nodes in 
a 60 node network. 
It can be seen from Fig. 5 that our misbehavior detection 
protocol is not significantly affected by the speed of the 
nodes in small networks. Our approach robustly keeps a gap 
between misbehaving nodes and correctly behaving nodes 
making it easy to spot nodes that are purposefully violating 
the principle of flow conservation. The fluctuations seen in 
both curves are likely to have occurred due to the sporadic 
losses of metrics reply packets (MREP) rather than the node 
speed. However, the same is not true for large scale 
networks, as it can be appreciated from Fig. 6. As the mean 
node speed increases the gap between misbehaving and 
correctly behaving nodes grows smaller. Nevertheless, a 
good level of discrimination is maintained. These results 
support our hypothesis that using a single detection to 
accuse a node is not sufficient since such an algorithm may 
lead to false accusations against correctly behaving nodes 
(Section IV.C). An accusation should be the result of a 
distributed consensus mechanism such as that proposed in 
SCAN [3] to ensure fairness to well behaved nodes while 
keeping a high probability of correctly accusing 
misbehaving nodes.  
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Figure 5.  Percentage of detections as a function of the increasing  
mean node speed (20 node network). 
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Figure 6.  Percentage of detections as a function of the increasing  
mean node speed (60 node network). 
B. Accusing Misbehaving Nodes 
This section presents first an evaluation of the average 
throughput gain offered by our proposed algorithm to 
networks affected by nodes that drop packets in a 
probabilistic manner. Results are shown for networks with 
20, 40, 60 and 120 nodes. Then, our final set of results 
analyzes the network overhead created by our approach and 
how it compares against the total traffic produced in the 
network. Networks simulated in this section were set up 
with 20% of its total nodes misbehaving by dropping 
packets with 60% percent probability (d = 0.6). The 
misbehavior threshold was 40% (αthreshld = 0.4). 
In order to see the improvement that our approach can 
bring to networks affected by packet forwarding 
misbehavior we consider the average throughput in terms of 
the mean node speed. Our graphs present results for 
networks without misbehaving nodes, networks with 
misbehaving nodes but without defense mechanisms in 
place, and networks that use our algorithm to deny access to 
misbehaving nodes. Results are displayed for networks 
containing 20, 40 and 60 nodes, which are distributed over 
areas of 40 000m2 (200m*200m), 80 000m2 
(282.84m*282.84m), and 120 000m2 (346.41m*346.41m) 
respectively in order to maintain a constant node density. 
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Figure 7.  Average network throughput as a function of the 
increasing mean node speed (20 node network). 
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Figure 8.  Average network throughput as a function of the 
increasing mean node speed (40 node network). 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show curves for 20, 40 and 60 node 
networks respectively. Each graph displays the average 
network throughput as a function of the increasing mean 
node speed for a) networks without misbehaving nodes (No 
Misbehavior), b) networks making use of our detection and 
accusation approach (Our Approach), and c) networks with 
misbehaving nodes but with no means of defending 
themselves from any type of attack (Misbehavior Alone).  
As it can be seen from the figures our approach improves 
the network throughput when it is used in networks 
exhibiting packet forwarding misbehavior. However, the 
average throughput cannot reach that of a network where 
there is not any misbehavior present. This is due to the fact 
that our algorithm requires of certain amount of time to 
collect the necessary data to detect and accuse misbehaving 
nodes. Thus, during this initial phase (data collection) 
misbehaving nodes can drop packets before being accused 
and isolated from the network. 
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Figure 9.  Average network throughput as a function of the 
increasing mean node speed (60 node network) 
With the purpose of seeing how our approach reacts to 
changes in a network’s node density our next set of results 
has been carried out in a network that preserves the same 
area as our previous 60 node network (120.000 m2 = 
346.41m*346.41m), but has double its number of nodes 
(120 nodes) so as to double its density. Figure 10 presents 
results for networks without misbehaving nodes, networks 
with misbehaving nodes but without defense mechanisms in 
place, and networks that use our algorithm to deny access to 
misbehaving nodes. 
From figure 10 it can be seen that our approach still 
works in networks with relative high node density. The 
network throughput of networks using our approach 
improves when compared against networks containing 
misbehaving nodes that are neither avoided nor penalized. 
However, networks that do not present node misbehavior at 
all still exhibit the best performance in terms of network 
throughput. 
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Figure 10.  Average network throughput as a function of the 
increasing mean node speed (120 node network) 
A network that implements our detection and accusation 
algorithm looks at bootstrap as a network without a 
protection scheme. However, as time elapses our algorithm 
starts detecting and accusing those nodes that drop a fraction 
of packets above a preset misbehavior threshold αthreshold. 
Consequently, in such a network any misbehaving nodes 
will eventually be detected, accused and denied network 
access, allowing the network to obtain an overall 
performance close to a network where nodes do not 
misbehave. 
The final set of results assesses the network overhead 
generated by our misbehavior detection and accusation 
algorithm as a function of the increasing mean node speed, 
and compares it against the network overhead produced by 
four constant bit rate (CBR) connections present in the 
network. Although CBR traffic is generated at the 
application layer, it is accounted for at the TCP/IP layer in 
the form of UDP network overhead. In this set of 
simulations misbehaving nodes drop packets with a 60% 
probability (d=0.6), the misbehavior threshold αthreshold is 
40%, the node speed varies between 0ms-1 (a static network) 
and 20ms-1, and the speed standard deviation is set at 
0.58ms-1. The network resources are calculated by adding 
one each time a packet crosses a different link: thus a 
MREQ packet broadcast that traverses three hops (links) 
contributes three packet-links to the total. Results are 
displayed for a network containing 40 nodes distributed over 
an area of 80 000m2 (282.84m*282.84m). 
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Figure 11.  Network overhead as a function of the increasing 
mean node speed (40 nodes) 
The network overhead shown in Fig. 11 is the sum of the 
overhead produced by the MREQ, MREP, MACK, DAP 
and AP packets. It is least when the nodes are stationary and 
increases with the mean node speed. The reader may be 
confused to see the UDP overhead to be the lowest in a 
static network (mean node speed = 0 m/sec). This can be 
explained as follows. In static networks link breakages are 
due only to collisions and the channel noise. This means that 
packets are more likely to arrive to their destination without 
need for retransmissions. This yields a high throughput and 
a lower network overhead since packets arrive constantly to 
their destination and traverse less times each link. On the 
other hand, in dynamic networks mobility frequently cause 
link breakages, retransmissions take place over almost every 
link increasing the network overhead. The throughput, 
instead, decreases due to the fact that fewer packets reach 
their destination. In contrast, the overhead generated by our 
scheme is higher in dynamic network because a node has 
greater probability to become in contact with more nodes. 
Therefore, more behavior checking tasks are scheduled 
which translates in a higher number of MREQ, MREP and 
MACK packets being transmitted. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The self-regulating nature of MANETs requires that they 
be able to monitor the behavior of the network. Limited 
resources mean that there is an incentive for nodes to 
misbehave by not correctly forwarding packets (selfish 
nodes); nodes may also misbehave for other reasons. 
In this paper we have presented an algorithm that is 
capable of detecting and accusing nodes that exhibit packet 
forwarding misbehavior. The algorithm does not require 
high density networks in which many nodes can overhear 
each others’ received and transmitted packets, but instead 
uses statistics accumulated by each node as it transmits to 
and receives data from its neighbors. Also, our algorithm 
does not interfere with the routing protocol which allows for 
its use regardless of the routing strategy employed. 
We have shown that we can detect nodes that misbehave 
by dropping a significant percentage of packets. Detection is 
successful in spite of inherent packet losses in MANETs 
caused by noisy links, mobility, and packet losses due to 
routing protocol behavior. To avoid falsely accusing 
correctly behaved nodes of misbehavior an accusation in our 
approach is based on a predefined number of detections 
performed not necessarily by the same node. 
Selecting an acceptable or tolerable level of misbehavior 
in a network is a policy decision that enables us to choose an 
adequate misbehavior threshold αthreshold. However, this 
threshold also depends on dynamic network parameters such 
as node density and network area. Therefore finding a way 
to calculate an optimal misbehavior threshold in a dynamic 
manner is of great importance, especially in autonomic 
environments where the network should automatically 
adjust its parameters so as to adapt itself to changes in its 
surroundings. In this respect our future research will focus 
on the study of methods to collect and synthesize network 
context information, and techniques to calculate an adaptive 
misbehavior threshold using such information. 
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